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1. Introduction 
Two prominent features of rural informal finance in low-income Asian countries are 
that the informal creditor is seldom a full-time moneylender and that informal credit is often 
combined with transactions in other markets.2 Informal lenders include landlords and 
farmer-cultivators, agricultural commodity traders and input dealers, grain millers, ambulant 
merchants, retail storeowners, fixed-salary employees and occasional moneylenders. 
Investigations of rural credit markets conducted in various countries in the last ten to fifteen 
years show that traders and farmer-cultivators have become increasingly involved in 
moneylending [Bardhan and Rudra (1978), TBAC (1981), Floro (1987), Bell (1990), 
Siamwalla (1990)]. This observation contrasts with the situation prevailing in the 1960s 
when landlords were reported to be the dominant source of informal rural credit. 
1 Respectively, the authors are Assistant Professor, School of Economics, University of 
the Philippines at Diliman; Research Specialist in the Department of Agricultural 
Economics and Rural Sociology, The Ohio State University; and Professor in the 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, The Ohio State University. 
Support for the research that underlies this paper was provided by AID/Washington, 
USAID /Manila, IRRI, PIDS and ACPC. Important support, encouragement and insights 
were provided by our colleagues at Ohio State, and by Cristina David, Mario Lamberte, 
Gilbert llanto, Keijiro Otsuka, and Bruce Tolentino. The usual disclaimers apply. 
2 See, for example, the volumes edited by Adams and Fitchett (1992) and Ghate (1992). 
See also the symposium issue of the World Bank Economic Review (1990) on •Imperfect 
Information and Rural Credit Markets. • 
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The rationale for combining credit with transactions in other markets has been the 
subject matter of the literature on interlinked transactions.3 More specifically, the complex 
relationship between landlord and tenant that encompasses both factor and product markets 
has been the focus of this literature. For instance, Braverman and Stiglitz (1982) and Mitra 
(1983) analyzed the linkage between consumption or production credit and a tenancy 
contract in terms of the incentive effect of borrowing on tenant effort. In Braverman and 
Guasch (1984) a credit cum tenancy contract is analyzed as a mechanism through which 
landlords sort high-ability tenants from a heterogeneous pool of applicants. The risk-sharing 
feature of interlinked transactions is examined by Kotwal (1985) who shows how 
consumption credit acts like insurance for tenant borrowers when there is production 
uncertainty. 
While informal credit invariably plays an important economic role in models of 
interlinked transactions, the models do not necessarily have a credit market focus. Rather, 
the focus of the analyses has been the market for tenancies where moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems provide the rationale for interlinking. The interlinked markets literature 
has leaned towards demonstrating within the framework of sharecropping the efficiency of 
interlinked arrangements when information is asymmetrically distributed between two 
contracting parties. Moreover, trader credit has been relatively neglected in the interlinked 
markets literature despite its observed tendency to become more pervasive with the 
3 An interlinked transaction is one in which two parties trade in at least two markets on 
the condition that the terms of all such trades are jointly determined. Bell (1988) surveys 
the literature. 
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commercialization of agriculture.4 As Bell (1988: p. 827) noted, •the interlinking of credit 
and output needs more specific attention than it has received so far.• 
This paper analyzes the interlinking of credit and marketing contracts from the 
perspective of a credit market transaction. A credit transaction involves the exchange of a 
good (the loan or financial service) now for a promise to pay a specified amount in the 
future. Uncertainty over the realization of the commitment, which is contingent upon the 
ability and willingness of the borrower to pay, is therefore inherent in all credit transactions. 
Collateral is regularly used to screen borrowers and to enforce debt contracts5 but its use 
in rural credit markets is frequently inhibited by an inhospitable insurance and legal 
environment. Furthermore, many rural borrowers lack sufficient amounts of assets 
considered acceptable as collateral (e.g. titled land) to secure their loans. Under these 
circumstances, both parties to a credit contract have an incentive to use collateral substitutes 
[Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1986)], of which credit tying or the interlinking of transactions 
is one form. 6 
This paper addresses the implications of credit tying as a collateral substitute on the 
operations of informal lenders in a rural financial market. Given that lenders employ 
4 The few exceptions include Gangopadhyay and Sengupta (1987), Floro (1987), Bell and 
Srinivasan (1989) and Fabella (1992). 
5 A collateral is any asset that the borrower agrees to forfeit to the creditor in the event 
of non-repayment of a loan. For an analysis of the screening role of collateral, see Bester 
(1985) and Besanko and Thakor (1988). The enforcement role of collateral is discussed in 
Benjamin (1978). 
6 Other forms of collateral substitutes are third party guarantees, the threat of exclusion 
from future credit market transactions, social ostracism and joint liability. While interlinked 
transactions have been referred to as collateral substitutes, they have not been explicitly 
analyzed as such. 
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different forms of market interlinkage (e.g. labor-credit, land-credit, output-credit) or none 
at all, a key argument is that informal creditors differ in theif abilities to deal with the 
information and enforcement problems in the credit market. Consequently, informal lenders 
limit their transactions largely to specific segments of the borrowing population about whom 
-
they are relatively well-informed and with whom they are capable of enforcing repayment. 
This implies that policy interventions which treat the informal credit market as an 
undifferentiated whole may miss their mark. 
In the next section, the motivation for credit market involvement by traders is 
discussed. The institutional setting for this discussion is the rice economy of the Philippines 
where yield-increasing production technology, land reform and rural bank failures have 
shaped the evolution of the rural credit market. The importance of trader-lenders as a 
source of informal credit is shown using data from village surveys. 
Using the notion that an interlinked contract acts as a collateral substitute, the third 
section illustrates the advantage of an informal rural lender who employs interlinking (an 
interlocker) over an informal lender who does not (a pure moneylender). This advantage 
is shown to translate into a more favorable loan contract, in terms of loan size and interest 
rate, for a borrower who confronts both types of lender. Allowing for different borrower 
types and differences in lenders' abilities to transact with them leads to the hypothesis that 
the allocation of informal credit is based on a matching system where a borrower's 
characteristics that are important from the viewpoint of the lender's non-credit market 
activities influence the probability of getting a loan. 
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The fourth section presents some empirical results using Philippine data that support 
the above characterization of the rural credit market. The paper concludes with a discussion 
of the limits of informal finance and some thoughts regarding policy intervention in rural 
financial markets. 
2. Traders as Lenders 
2.1 Motivation 
One of the stylized facts about informal rural finance in low-income countries is the 
presence of commodity traders who provide production loans to farm producers with or 
without explicit interest and with the requirement that the output be sold to or through the 
trader-creditor. Since traders are essentially buy-and-sell agents, their involvement in 
informal credit is motivated mainly by their objective to secure reliable sources of the traded 
good. This is especially true for crops such as rice and com which have a definite 
production cycle. 
Suppose that a farmer produces output Q according to the production function Q = 
Q(B; N) where B is a variable input and N is a fixed input. Assume that all variable inputs 
are financed from borrowing. At harvest time, the farmer sells his marketable surplus, q, 
at a given price p to the trader and repays his loan ( 1 + r )B, where r is the contractual rate 
of interest on loans from the village moneylender. Household consumption of Q is x, a 
constant. The profit from operating the farm is 
6 
nl = p[Q(B,N) -x] - (1 +r)B (1) 
where the bracketed expression [Q(B;N)-x] equals q, the producer's marketable surplus. 
Maximizing (1) with respect to B yields the first-order condition for the profit-maximizing 
level of borrowing, B", as a function of output price and the rate of interest, denoted by 
B"(p,r). Any s• for a given value of xis associated with a q*[B*(p,r)] which is the level of 
marketable surplus that B" can support. 
The source of the commodity trader's profit is the difference between the 
competitively determined market price P at which he sells q and his purchase price p plus 
the cost c incurred for performing the trading function. The trader's profit may then be 
written as 
(2) 
where E q~ is the total quantity of q purchased from producers i = 1, 2, ... n and each 
producer sells his q·. Clearly trader profits are positively related to q;. 
If the local output market is competitive, the trader is unable to set p so that the only 
way to maximize profits is to increase the volume of trading, E q;. However, the total 
volume bought and sold in the local market is the sum of the individual producers' q • s, over 
which the trader has no control. The trader can, of course, try to increase E 'b by increasing 
the number of producers from whom he buys products. But without an instrument to attract 
existing sellers, an increased market share may not be realized. With many traders, there 
is no certainty either that any new producer will sell to him. The trader's problem is, 
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therefore, how to induce more producers to sell their output to him as well as to influence 
the quantity of 'h purchased from each producer. 
From (2) trading profits are affected through q; by the producer's borrowing behavior 
as embodied in B*(r), his loan demand function. Suppose there is a change in r. Then 
d:r. r aEqt aB • 
- = (P-p-c) -- < 0 
dr aB" ar 
(3) 
shows that the interest rate at which the producer is able to obtain credit affects the trader's 
profits. Thus, an increase in interest faced by borrowers adversely affects the trader's 
income from marketing. But where the trader has no control over r, he cannot do anything 
about 'h· This provides the motivation for the trader's involvement in the credit market. 
By providing farm producers with a credit line, the trader can then require his borrowers 
to market their output through him.7 
Local economies of scale in trading contribute to the competition for market share 
among traders and increase the incentive for individual traders to obtain guarantees of 
output delivery at harvest time in exchange for credit. Two other reasons for trader lending 
are proposed by Floro and Yotopoulos (1991): the alternative use oftrader's capital through 
moneylending during the planting season when trader's funds are idle and farm households 
need liquidity; and the advantage that may derive from interlinking because of a lower 
7 The tie-in sale provision in the loan contract does not necessarily guarantee that the 
borrower will make good on his promise to sell his output to the trader. The trader must 
still ensure that sufficient incentives exist for the borrower to honor the tie-in sale provision. 
Access to future loans is one such incentive. 
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procurement price for the crop delivered at harvest time when market prices are 
comparatively low. 
This analysis suggests that, from the trader's viewpoint, the credit transaction is 
necessary to the extent that it sustains his trading activity.8 From the borrower's viewpoint, 
the attractiveness of the informal credit arrangement is due in part to inaccessibility of the 
formal credit market to asset-poor borrowers who do not possess collateral generally 
accepted by lenders. The interlinked arrangement, by ensuring the double coincidence of 
interests between the trader-lender and the farmer-borrower, can fulfill the role of a 
collateral substitute, without which lending may be highly risky for the former and borrowing 
prohibitively costly for the latter. 
2.2 Relative Importance 
Table 1 presents data taken from various surveys conducted at different times and 
in different geographic areas in the Philippines which show the share of various types of 
informal lenders in the total volume of loans transacted in rice-growing areas. The columns 
may not be directly comparable because of sampling differences and possible discrepancies 
in the classification of lender types. Variations in production environments across the areas 
covered in the surveys also limit data comparability. Nevertheless the pattern shown is in 
8 The same may be said for farmer-lenders who engage in moneylending to reduce 
monitoring and recruitment cost of hired labor. The analytics involved are presented in 
Esguerra (1993) and are essentially similar to what can be found in existing models of 
interlinked credit and tenancy contracts. 
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general agreement with expectations given the developments that affected agriculture and 
rural financial markets in the Philippines during the periods under consideration. 
Table 1: SHARE OF DIFFERENT LENDER TYPES IN TOTAL VOLUME OF 
WANS TRANSACfED, V ARlO US YEARS, PI-llLIPPINES 
Lender Type 1957-58• 
Rice 
Total Formal 25.1 




Input Dealer 0.0 
Farmer 0.0 
Other Merchants 0.0 
Other Sources 7.7 
Rice Miller 0.0 
a Survey area: Nueva Ecija province 
b Survey area: Nationwide 
1957-58b 1975-76c 197gd 
Rice Rice Rice 
Percent of Total Volume of Loans 
20.0 78.4 32.0 
80.0 21.6 68.0 
23.0 0.0 12.2 
8.0 20.0 14.8 
0.0 0.0 0.4 
0.0 0.0 9.6 
4.0 0.0 13.6 
28.0 0.0 0.8 
17.0 1.5 15.0 
0.0 0.0 1.6 
c Survey area: lloilo, llocos and Zamboanga provinces 
d Survey areas: Provinces of Bulacan, Camarines Sur and Isabela 
e Survey areas: Provinces of Cagayan, Nueva Ecija and lloilo 













The share of informal loans has always exceeded the share of formal loans, with the 
exception of the period 1975-76. This period coincided with the peak of Masagana 99, the 
government-sponsored subsidized credit program for rice which targeted small rural 
borrowers.9 This program increased the share of formal credit going to agriculture in its 
9 Esguerra (1981) provides an analysis of the redistributive impact of this credit subsidy 
program. 
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early years. However, loan arrearages eventually led to its demise in the early eighties, and 
many rural banks subsequently failed. The informal lenders then reasserted their dominance 
over the rural credit market. 
The composition of informal lenders has also changed over the years. Landlords 
accounted for 61 percent of the loan volume in rice areas before 1960, but after 1980 their 
share had dropped to less than three percent. What is striking is that the 1984 data contain 
information from two provinces other than Nueva Ecija10 not included in the 1957-58 data 
where land reform is not known to be as successful. So that even allowing for the possibility 
that the 1984 data might have underestimated the proportion of loans from landlords, the 
data still reflect a sizable decline in landlord share that has to be explained. On the other 
hand the share of trader-lender loans has increased from less than 10 to 41 percent within 
the last twenty-five years. The same trend can be observed for farmer-lenders whose loan 
share had risen to 25 percent in the 1980s from nil prior to 1960. 
The change in composition of informal lenders descnbed above can be explained as 
a concomitant feature of the process of commercialization of rural economies. In the 
Philippine rice economy, the impetus came from Green Revolution technological changes 
and land reform in the 1970s. With the new rice technology, the induced adoption of 
commercially produced inputs and the production of larger marketable surpluses hastened 
the development of both input and output markets. Tenurial arrangements were affected 
10 Nueva Ecija is the primary rice growing province in Central Luzon, accounting for 
more than half the region's rice output. More than 90 percent of the cultivated area in 
Nueva Ecija is planted to rice. 
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by land reform and one option adopted by some former landlords was to become commodity 
traders. All these changes had an impact on rural financial markets.11 
The increased yields resulting from the modem rice varieties created profit 
opportunities in output marketing. Recent studies of the rice marketing system in the 
Philippines [Umali (1987), Umali and Duff (1988)], using survey data from Muftoz,U Nueva 
Ecija, show that the rice marketing functions (e.g. storing, milling, transporting and retailing) 
are carried out by different private agents. Traders and commission agents buy paddy 
directly from farmers for resale to rice millers who store and mill it into rice. Milled rice 
is then sold to wholesalers and retailers. 
Umali reports rather high trading profits for traders operating in Munoz. However, 
given the generally small volume of grain handled by traders and the seasonal nature of 
their activity, the profitability of buying and selling is concentrated in a fairly short harvest 
and post harvest season of only two to three months. Most owners of grain-buying stations 
report that their profits greatly depend upon their volume and rate of turnover. Because 
of this fact and the price competition caused by many paddy buyers, it is in the interest of 
individual traders to maintain regular and secure sources of paddy during the trading season. 
Lending to farmers during the cropping season on the condition that they get first claim to 
the borrower's harvest helps assure the traders of a stable paddy supply. This implies that 
11 A discussion of how technological change and land reform affected rural financial 
markets in the Philippine rice economy can be found in Esguerra (1993) and in Esguerra 
and Meyer (1992). 
11 Munoz is one of the municipalities of Nueva Ecija. It serves as the town center for 
about twenty rice growing villages. 
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traders evaluate the creditworthiness of loan applicants on the basis of their ability to supply 
paddy at ha.IVest time. The size of the borrower's marketable surplus is, therefore, an 
important screening variable that trader-lenders use in their lending. 
Recent information on the relative importance of trader-lenders in informal credit 
markets is contained in two studies of the rural financial market in Muftoz, Nueva Ecija. 
In the villages of Maragol and Gabaldon, Nagarajan (1992) found a variety of informal 
lenders including farmers, traders, professional moneylenders, landlords, retail storeowners 
and other occasional lenders (e.g. school teachers and other professionals). Out of the 150 
different lenders operating in the two villages, 57 percent were farmers and 17 percent were 
traders. While traders were less important in terms of number, they were involved in more 
transactions than farmer-lenders and they also lent larger loans. These data, which cover 
the three cropping seasons in 1988-1989, show that of 599 informal loans transacted, traders 
accounted for 41 percent and farmers 39 percent. In terms of total loan volume, the share 
for traders was 63 percent while farmers had 21 percent. 
Esguerra (1993) used data collected from two cropping seasons in 1987-1988 from 
four other villages13 in Muiioz and found that traders and farmers constituted the major 
sources of informal loans in these villages (Table 2). Together these two lender types made 
up 56 percent of all informal lenders reported in the village surveys and accounted for 59 
percent of the total amount of reported loan transactions. The largest single category of 
informal lenders was farmer-lenders who made up 48 percent of the number of informal 
lenders. However, they provided only 24 percent of the total value of loans made. Paddy 
13 The villages are Villa Nati, Sapang Kawayan, Villa Cuizon and Mangandingay. 
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traders or rice middlemen clearly were the most important loan source in terms of their 
share in the total volume (35 percent). Their share in the total number of reported loans 
was 31 percent. 
Table 2: 1HE RElATIVE IMPORTANCE OF INFORMAL LENDERS IN FOUR 
VILI..AGES OF MUNOZ, NUEVA ECUA 
Informal Number of Percent Share in Percent Share Average Monthly 
Lender Type Lenders Number of Loans in Total Loan Interestc Rate 
Volume (%) 
Farmers 48 34 24 7.4 
Moneylenders 6 12 12 14.9 
Trader /Millers 16 31 35 9.1 
Others• 45 17 19 10.4 
All Informal Types 115 94 90 
Formal Sourcesb 5 6 10 3.3 
• Includes retail storeowners, input dealers, civil servants and occasional lenders. 
b Includes a rural bank, a commercial bank branch and a cooperative. 
c For loans requiring repayment in kind, rates were imputed from product prices. 
Source: Esguerra (1993) 
In terms of how technological change and land reform affected product and factor 
markets, the pattern described above for the Philippines has its parallels in other countries. 
As early as the 1970s, Bardhan and Rudra (1978) already noted the trend in India towards 
self-cultivation with the help of hired labor. They attributed this trend to the profitability 
of self-cultivation because of advances in technology and tenure legislation. In the 
Philippines, these factors help explain the prominence of farmer-lenders. The importance 
of traders as informal lenders is also consistent with the observations of other analysts 
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regarding the tendency for the share of trader-lender loans to grow with increasing 
commercialization (Bell (1988)].14 
3. Tied Output Sales as a Collateral Substitute 
3.1 Rationale 
The tying of credit to output sales to the creditor serves as a collateral substitute in 
two ways. First, it acts as a screening device. The requirement to sell output to the creditor 
has the effect of sorting loan applicants into two groups: one group who needs marketing 
services, and the second group who have less need of these services. Small farmers often 
have an incentive to use the services of a trader or marketing middleman because typically 
they cannot afford to invest in storage and in acquiring their own means of transporting 
their output to the market, or cannot do so as cheaply as traders. 
The middleman usually shoulders the cost of transporting the product and relieves 
the farmer of storage problems. In the Central Luzon rice producing areas, the common 
alternative is to hire the services of private vehicle owners (usually pedicab operators) who 
normally charge a fixed amount per sack of paddy. Small producers, but with larger 
marketable surpluses are, therefore, attracted to a credit cum marketing contract because 
of the reduction in marketing costs. Traders, on the other hand, prefer to transact with 
farmers with larger marketable surpluses to the extent that there are local economies of 
scale in procuring and storing output. From a credit market viewpoint, borrowers with 
14 This tendency has been empirically observed in India by Bell (1990), and in Thailand 
by Siamwalla et al (1990). 
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larger marketable surpluses will also tend to have a better ability to repay their loans. Thus, 
by indirectly screening out those loan applicants with a lesser ability to produce a large 
marketable surplus, the linked output arrangement in effect also indirectly screens out 
applicants with less ability to repay loans. 
Second, the marketing-credit link is an additional instrument for enforcing the loan 
contract. By acting as the buyer of the borrower's produce, the lender can more directly 
verify the borrower's repayment ability at harvest time, as well as simultaneously satisfy his 
claim to a portion of the proceeds from the output sale. The degree to which the lender 
can enforce the credit contract depends, however, upon the incentives that exist for the 
borrower to fulfill his promise to deliver the output to the creditor. H the creditor is the 
only outlet through whom the borrower can market his product, then enforcement of the 
credit contract is facilitated by the interlinkage of credit with marketing. If there are 
competing marketing outlets available to the borrower, repayment is not necessarily 
guaranteed, because the borrower may sell his output elsewhere and choose not to repay 
the loan. The possibility of this occurrence can be reduced, however, by several factors. 
Trader-lenders may engage in close monitoring of their borrowers' actions. They may 
informally employ village residents for the purpose of informing them about the timing and 
size of their borrowers' harvests. In most cases, traders will be present at harvest time to 
provide the means for hauling and transporting the borrower's output to the market, so this 
reduces the borrower's opportunities to escape repayment At the extreme, output buyers 
may share information about their clientele, and the knowledge that a co-worker in the 
trade is being cheated could result in their refusal to do business with that farmer. The 
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switching of lenders undoubtedly occurs when one trader essentially buys out the contract 
of another, but probably both the farmer and the new trader expect this to mark the 
beginning of a long-term relationship in which the farmer will have access to loans. 
On the borrower side, the savings in transaction costs resulting from the credit-
-
marketing linkage, compared to two separate credit and trading contracts, may be significant 
enough to deter selling to traders other than the creditor. In addition, the linked transaction 
may make the possible discovery of undesirable behavior in one market and the costs of loss 
of reputation too costly for the borrower-seller because of spillover effects that threaten 
other transaction(s) [Bardhan (1989)]. For instance, if the borrower does not repay or sell 
his product through his lender, he may lose in two ways. He may find himself without any 
credit source in the next cropping season and he may also incur higher marketing costs 
because he lost a ready buyer in his former creditor. Under the circumstances presented 
above, the marketing-credit link makes the credit contract enforceable and, therefore, acts 
as an effective collateral substitute. 
The marketing link, however, is necessarily an *imperfect• form of collateral 
substitute in that it does not always assure that the lender will be fully repaid. Since the 
crop is the collateral, production uncertainty makes the returns from lending vulnerable to 
chance occurrences.15 In addition, the possibility always exists that a borrower may engage 
in opportunistic behavior unless there are incentives strong enough to discourage this action. 
15 Where crop insurance is available, some of the production uncertainty may be 
reduced. A trader-lender could require that insurance is purchased and even lend money 
for the premium. 
17 
The marketing link, therefore, fails to qualify as an ideal form of collateral16 because it 
easily violates the requirement concerning the absence of collateral-specific risk [Binswanger 
and Rosenzweig (1986)]. 
32 A Diagrammatic Exposition 
A model of a credit transaction is needed in order to analyze how the trader-lenders 
and farmer-borrowers benefit from using market interlinkage as a collateral substitute. The 
model presented here is based on Milde and Riley (1988). Only a graphical analysis is 
presented below with a more detailed discussion found in Esguerra (1993). 
Assume a risk neutral farmer-borrower maximizing expected profit, En. Figure 1 
shows the borrower's notional demand schedule D(r) for loans from the informal credit 
market. Associated with the borrower's demand schedule is a family of iso-expected profit 
cwves which are concave in the space of loan size, B, and the rate of interest, r, the 
maximum points coinciding with the demand curve. One of the borrower's iso-expected 
profit curves is shown as Enb. All points on the contour E,rb yield the same level of 
expected profit regardless of the interest rate and loan size combination. !so-expected profit 
curves in the southeast direction denote higher expected profits as they involve combinations 
of larger loan sizes and lower interest rates. 
16 That is, in the sense that the lender cannot fully recover the amount of the debt in 







Loan Size (B) 
Contractural Equilibrium for Trader-Lenders and Moneylenders 
There is a pure moneylender maximizing expected profit, z. Suppose that 
moneylending is characterized by free entry. Let Z0 be the moneylender's zero iso-expected 
profit contour which is the locus of contracts (loan size and interest rate combinations) that 
yield zero profits for the moneylender. Above zero profit levels are denoted by iso-expected 
profit curves to the northeast of Z0• It can be shown that Z0 will have both a declining and 
an increasing portion. On the declining portion where loan sizes are relatively small, fixed 
costs are more important than default costs, so increasing loan size reduces the effect of 
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these costs. As B increases, however, the probability of involuntary default increases since 
the borrower's repayment obligation increases while his debt service capacity will be 
constrained at some point by decreasing returns on investments. In addition, a larger loan 
size may increase default if it increases the incentive for a borrower to •take the money and 
run. • For large values of B, therefore, default costs are the more important cost component 
influencing the lender's iso-expected profit curve. 
In a competitive credit market, borrowers will maximize their expected profits by 
choosing a combination of r and B subject to the constraint that the moneylender does not 
make a loss on the contract offered. Graphically, the equilibrium is defined by a point of 
tangency between the borrower's and lender's iso-expected profit contours shown as point 
E in Figure 1. This is a familiar result seen in the recent credit market literature [Jaffee 
and Russell (1976), Milde and Riley (1988), Bell (1988)]. 
Suppose there is a trader-lender. Let the trader's zero iso-expected profit contour 
be described by zT. In the interlinked transaction, the trader-lender is able to combine the 
screening and enforcement functions of moneylending with his trading functions. The 
economies of scope realized in undertaking this joint activity translate into lower lending 
costs which allow the trader-lender to offer loans at more favorable terms than can the pure 
moneylender. Therefore, in Figure 1, zT lies below Z0 so that for the same rate of interest 
(loan size), the trader-lender can offer the borrower a larger (lower) loan (interest rate) 
than the pure moneylender. The pure moneylender cannot compete with the trader because 
any contract offer below Z0 will be unprofitable for him. Equilibrium is at point I involving 
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a lower rate of interest and a larger loan compared to point E so the borrower is clearly 
better off with the linked contract. 
The preceding discussion would seem to suggest a scenario where pure moneylenders 
are driven out of business by interlockers. This could occur in a credit market regime where 
informal lenders can insist on exclusive contracts. The difficulty of enforcing exclusivity in 
credit agreements, however, does not make such a possibility probable. H contracts are non-
exclusive, the borrower may still resort to the pure moneylender if his transactions with the 
interlocker leave him with an unsatisfied demand for credit, which is always possible when 
collateral is imperfect. However, even in the unlikely situation in which exclusive contracts 
can be enforced, the pure moneylender may be the only other source of loans for borrowers 
who do not possess the collateral substitute required by the interlocker. 
The advantage conferred by the interlinked contract on the interlocker is limited to 
borrowers who are within the scope of the interlocker's non-credit market activity. For 
instance, the trader in good X reaps the advantage of scope economies by being a creditor 
to producers of good X. However, with respect to producers of good Y, the trader in good 
X may not be able to offer a better loan contract than the pure moneylender when the 
scope economies enjoyed in interlinking are specific to transactions with good X 
producers.17 The presence of lenders who can offer interlinked loans, therefore, does not 
necessarily drive pure moneylenders out of the rural credit market. 
17 Another possibility is that the economies of scale of a large moneylender may swamp 
the economies of scope of a small trader. 
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This line of argument can be extended to the case of different borrower and lender 
types. Consider two borrower types, namely, farmers and landless workers, and two creditor 
types, farmer-lenders and trader-lenders, all of which are prevalent in the rice-growing areas 
of the Philippines. Farmers regularly deal with agricultural workers in the labor market, and 
can make use of the loan applicant's commitment of labor services as a collateral substitute. 
Loan contracts between farmer employers and their workers are enforceable because the 
outstanding debt can be subtracted from the worker's wages at harvest time. Traders cannot 
do the same with respect to landless workers. In addition, since traders usually operate 
from town centers, they have less intimate knowledge of village residents, and are unable 
to make use of the informal network of village social relations for gathering information 
about loan applicants who are landless workers. Obviously, it is the farmer-lender is better 
equipped with the screening and enforcement technology for dealing with landless workers 
in the credit market. 
Trader-lenders, on the other hand, have an advantage over farmer-lenders in dealing 
with farmer-borrowers because of their regular contact in the product market. This contact 
produces information for traders regarding various farmers' resources and abilities to pay. 
Traders can then condition loans on their right to exclusively purchase the borrower's 
output, and through such linkage enforce repayment.18 
The trader's advantage over the farmer-lender may also derive from a lower 
opportunity cost of lending during the planting season. The trader's funds are relatively 
18 Part of the trader-lenders' advantages may be diminished in environments where 
farmers are accustomed to exchanging labor and other services. 
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abundant during this period, putting him in an excellent position to meet the credit demand 
of farmers.19 On the other hand, because of the concurrent timing of crop growth cycles 
and farm operations within an ecologically circumscribed agricultural region, a farmer will 
generally be constrained in his ability to lend funds to other farmers during the planting 
season. 
Differences in the nature of the principal economic activities of informal lenders 
account for different forms of interlinked transactions. From a credit market perspective, 
these forms of interlinkage may be broadly interpreted as different screening and 
enforcement technologies which are lender- and borrower-type specific. That is, the 
advantage that derives from their use is limited by the nature of the economic activities of 
both the borrower and the lender. A trader-lender cannot effectively employ a marketing 
link to enforce loan repayment from a landless farm laborer who has little or no marketable 
surplus. Neither can he condition a loan granted to a landless worker on the latter's 
commitment of farm labor services unless the trader is also engaged in farming or another 
activity for which he needs to employ labor. Similarly, it is difficult for a farmer-lender to 
secure a loan made unless he already has excess capacity for hauling, storing and 
transporting a farmer-borrower's product to the wholesale market. Thus, the specificity of 
the screening and enforcement technology embodied in the interlinked contract implies 
differential advantages for different interlocker types in dealing with different types of 
clienteles in the rural credit market. 
19 It is expected that the trader will liquidate his previous stocks over the growing 
season so his liquidity rises at the same time the farmer's liquidity declines due to 
production and consumption expenditures. 
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4. Evidence of Matching 
The preceding analysis provides an explanation for the common observation that the 
informal credit market is actually composed of small market niches where lenders and 
borrowers are matched on the basis of some existing personal or business relationship 
outside of the credit market. It also helps explain why all borrowers do not have equal 
access to all informal credit sources. 
When lending is done primarily to promote a related economic activity, the attributes 
of borrowers that contribute to the profitability of that activity become crucial screening 
variables for the credit transaction. In the case of trader-lenders who lend primarily to 
sustain their trading activity, it is expected that their loans will go mainly to farmer-
borrowers who have large marketable surpluses of the traded commodity. On the other 
hand, farmer-lenders who lend in order to reduce labor recruitment and monitoring costs 
are expected to lend a proportionately larger share of loans to households with a higher rate 
of participation in the rural labor market (i.e. landless agricultural households, small 
subsistence farmers, large households). 
Studies of how borrowers and lenders are matched in the informal credit markets in 
the Philippines have examined the characteristics that differentiate the clienteles of trader-
lenders from those of farmer-lenders. Floro (1987) studied the sorting behavior of trader-
and farmer-lenders using 1984 survey data from both developed and marginal areas in three 
Philippine provinces.20 Borrowers were classified by income strata into poor, middle and 
20 Developed areas were defined as those which exhibited high productivity and a 
relatively high degree of commercialization, while marginal areas did not. The provinces 
were Cagayan, Nueva Ecija and lloilo. 
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rich households.21 Conditional probabilities of credit disbursements to the different 
borrower classes were computed for trader-lenders and farmer-lenders. Floro found that 
in both the developed and marginal areas, the probability that rich farm households 
obtained their loans from traders was fairly close to unity, while the probability that poor 
borrowers obtained their loans from farmer-lenders was higher than the probability of 
borrowing from any other source. She also found that trader-lenders allocated a larger 
proportion of their loans to rich farmers, while farmer-lenders allocated more to poor ones. 
Nagarajan's (1992) study of 127 farm households in two villages of Muiloz, Nueva 
Ecija revealed the same pattern found by Floro. When households were classified by farm 
size, the results showed that 66 percent of the reported farmer-lender loans were transacted 
with farm households operating less than two hectares compared with 52 percent of trader 
loans going to this category. The trader's preference for larger farms was evident in that 
48 percent of their loans went to households with farm sizes over two hectares compared 
to 34 percent for farmer-lender loans. Farm households operating less than one hectare of 
farmland borrowed more frequently from farmer-lenders while those with larger farms 
borrowed more from trader-lenders. In addition, Nagarajan found that 55 percent of trader-
lender loans went to persons classified as business partners in trading, and 58 percent of all 
trader loans went to borrowers who had been regularly borrowing from the traders for more 
than five years. 
21 This classification was based on the annual net earnings of the 111 farm households 
included in the sample. For details, see Floro (1987) and Floro and Yotopoulos (1991). 
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The pattern of credit allocation in four other villages of Muiioz was examined by 
Esguerra (1993) using credit market data provided by 170 households. Unlike the two 
previous studies, f~ landless and non-farm households were all included in the borrower 
sample. Seventy-four percent of all trader loans went to farm households, representing 89 
percent of the total volume of loans granted by traders during 1987-88. For the farm 
households, traders provided 35 percent of the total number and 38 percent of the total 
amount of loans received. Traders, therefore, lent primarily to farmers, and farmers 
borrowed mainly from traders. 
On the other hand, 44 and 22 percent of the number and volume, respectively, of 
farmer-lender loans went to landless workers. For the landless households, farmer-lenders 
were the most important source of informal loans, accounting for 57 percent of the total 
number and 45 percent of the total volume of loans received. The amount of credit going 
to this group is significant in view of the fact that landless farm laborers are generally poor, 
possess no collateralizable assets and are normally considered bad credit risks. These data 
suggest the comparative advantage of farmer-lenders in lending to this particular group of 
rural loan applicants consistent with their ability to enforce repayment through a labor-
linked contract. 
Econometric tests of the probability of obtaining loans from the different informal 
lender types support the hypotheses that trader- and farmer-lenders choose their borrowers 
based on the requirements of their occupational specializations. Nagarajan estimated a 
multinomiallogit model with the probabilities of obtaining loans from alternative informal 
sources (including none) as the dependent variable and borrower characteristics as 
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explanatory variables. She found that poorer households with smaller marketable surpluses 
had a higher probability of being matched with farmer-lenders than with trader-lenders. On 
the other hand, farm households with higher initial wealth (as measured by total value of 
physical assets excluding land) and a capacity to produce a larger marketable output tend 
to be matched with trader-lenders. 
Esguerra also estimated a multinomial logit model and found that the important 
characteristics that differentiated the borrowing clienteles of trader-lenders from farmer-
lenders were associated mainly with the capacity to produce a marketable surplus of paddy 
and to participate in the rural labor market. Based on various indicators of readiness to 
supply farm labor (e.g. landlessness, labor contract type, degree of dependence on labor 
income), borrowers from trader-lenders tended to participate less in the labor market than 
borrowers from farmer-lenders. The inference, therefore, is that these borrowers are more 
likely to be full-time farm cultivators than small subsistence farmers and landless rural 
workers. Farm size, which was used as a proxy for the ability to produce a marketable 
surplus, also discriminated the customers of trader-lenders from those of farmer-lenders. 
Borrowers from traders tended to have larger farm plots, but the farm size variable 
performed best as a predictor in the presence of dummy variables for different tenurial 
arrangements and village location. The dummy variables for tenure status were used as 
indicators of the borrowing household's command over the disposition of output. Land 
ownership was found to be crucial for entering into a contract with trader-lenders. In 
general the data supported the hypothesis that farmer-lenders and trader-lenders sort 
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borrowers based on ability to supply labor services and marketable surplus, respectively, 
which are key inputs in the lenders farming and trading activities. 
5. Conclusion and Implications 
The preceding discussion suggests that an essential feature of informal credit within 
interlinked contracts is the importance of lender type in the credit transaction. This is a 
consequence of the costliness of contract enforcement on the one hand, and the limited 
-
ability of borrowers to offer easily marketable collateral on the other hand. Restrictions on 
the range of possible assets that can be advanced as security for a loan - because of 
unfavorable initial endowments or limited or absent (sales) markets-- restrict borrowers to 
lenders who have direct use value for the collateral (substitute) offered. The requirement 
for a double coincidence of interests to exist between borrower and lender basically 
disti~guishes an informal credit transaction with interlinkage from a pure credit transaction 
with a financial intermediary. 
The fact that labor-linked and product-linked informal credit transactions are most 
prevalent in several Asian countries raises the question of the conditions under which these 
types of financial transactions can be expected to appear and serve as a complementary 
source of finance, especially for small, low-income farm households. These conditions 
appear to include technological change which increases farmer demand for credit to 
purchase inputs, the production of a significant marketable surplus, and regulations or local 
customs which prevent tenancy contracts in which landlords provide most of the informal 
credit. There must be a sufficient volume of commodities produced with marketing margins 
28 
attractive enough to encourage the entry of specialized traders. Furthermore, the regulatory 
and institutional environment must be conducive to private (as opposed to parastatal or 
cooperative) trading; there must be sufficiently good transportation and communication 
systems to facilitate the assembly, transport and storage of commodities; and the formal 
financial system must not be a dependable supplier of rural loans. In other words, there 
must be a favorable enough environment for a significant group of farmers to be able to 
produce and a group of traders that want to compete in trading. 
The existence of various types of informal interlinked credit contracts can make an 
important contribution to the financing of development, but the limitations are obvious and 
important. First because of the matching of borrowers and lenders discussed above, rural 
credit markets will tend to be segmented with a number of implications. One is that a 
farmer wanting to finance a new crop in an area where it is not typically grown will have 
difficulty in finding a suitable lender who is willing to make the loan. To the extent that the 
opportunities for linking credit with other transactions are associated with the development 
of agricultural markets, a second implication is that borrowers in low productivity, less 
commercialized areas will likely have less access to credit and face higher costs, as is the 
case with formal finance and most other services and commodities. A third is that the 
lenders, who by definition are limited to operations in fairly small geographic areas where 
returns are correlate~ will be vulnerable to major shocks (droughts, typhoons, floods, etc.) 
and may be unable to meet the simultaneous demand for loans from many potential 
borrowers. 
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A second major limitation is that these interlinked contracts are most likely to be 
limited to short-term working capital for selected commodities and will not likely be the 
source of investment capital for machinery, equipment and land improvements. Finally, 
because of the cost of acquiring information, traders in newly privatized markets are likely 
to proceed slowly and may provide little credit initially until they have successfully 
developed relationships with a set of producers they can trust. Failure to do so would likely 
be fatal for traders in those countries where respect for contracts has disappeared.22 
Considering that this type of informal finance successfully meets some important 
needs, what should be the appropriate role of public policy? Are there things that 
governments and donors can and should do to stimulate interlinked credit contracts? The 
first obvious point is to reduce or remove impediments for traders to engage in such 
transactions. In some cases, financial institutions have been prohibited from making 
marketing loans because trading was considered speculative. The important point is that 
trader loans made prior to or during the production season can have a positive impact on 
production. This should be encouraged, not prohibited. 
The institutional design challenge is to create an incentive-compatible contract that, 
on the one hand, utilizes the local agent's superior information and contract enforcement 
technology and, on the other hand, the financial institution's access to more and cheaper 
funds. One obvious way employed by some banks is to hire bank staff from the local 
community. A second way involves the development of three-party agreements involving 
22• Peace and order problems in many parts of the Philippines in recent years are likely 
to have inhibited informal credit contracts because of the uncertainties faced by both 
farmers and traders. Similar problems likely exist in many African countries. 
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farmers, traders (including cooperatives) and banks. The farmers agree to produce and 
deliver to the trader. The trader screens the farmers prior to entering into the purchase 
agreement. The trader may provide seed and other inputs not readilly available in the 
market. The bank provides the loan with the trader deducting the loan payments from the 
proceeds at the time of sale. These arrangements work particularly weH when the trader 
(such as the wheat cooperatives in Brazil) is the only outlet for the farmers' product. -
-
One attempt to use local involvement in loan screening and collection that was a 
great failure was the use of loan committees to compile lists of eligible farmer-borrowers 
in Bangladesh. Anyone who had enough influence to get placed on the list essentially 
received an entitlement to a loan. Many loans were coverted into grants by the borrowers 
who defaulted and the committees did little to help the banks collect (Khalily and Meyer 
(1993)]. Some attempts are being made in African countries to utilize local village headmen 
to screen individual borrowers, witness loan documents, and in some cases co-sign the loans. 
There is little systematic information on how well these experiments are working. The use 
of the political chief of the village or the clan leader to screen borrowers and induce loan 
repayments seems to work well in Indonesia [Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega (1993)]. 
These examples demonstrate the nature of the information and incentive problems 
that arise in this particular principal-agent relationship. These problems are only beginning 
to be analyzed [e.g. Fuentes (1992)]. They concern the fact that it is difficult and costly for 
the formal institution to ascertain the veracity of the information provided by the agent in 
the screening process, and the amount of effort expended by the agent in loan monitoring 
and collection. Such considerations have implications on the type of informal lenders that 
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formal institutions would prefer to deal with and the agricultural environment in which any 
particular scheme for credit delivery will work. 
Another method of incorporating locally based informal lenders into official credit 
programs is for formal institutions to lend money to informal lenders with the stipulation 
that they on-lend it to borrowers targeted by the credit program. This scheme delegates to 
informal lenders the decision for allocating loans to applicants considered creditworthy and, 
in effect, merely formalizes what is already going on in rural financial markets. If informal 
lenders are expected to take full responsibility for loan repayment, 23 then it is more likely 
that they will limit lending only to their regular clientele based on the system of borrower-
lender matching discussed above. As a result, either the same borrowers will receive larger-
sized loans, or some substitution of funds will occur as borrowed funds replace the 
moneylender's own resources for lending. Repayment rates will most likely be high, but it 
is doubtful that there will be a significant expansion of lending to borrowers not previously 
served. Thus, it is questionable whether much is gained in using informal lenders as 
channels for formal credit. Furthermore, it is reasonable to question if the government 
should in any way subsidize an activity that private agents will undertake on their own 
anyway. 
Still another consideration concerns the existing market structure in the informal 
credit market and the nature of the interactions among existing informal lenders. H the 
informal credit market is competitive, the infusion of funds from the formal sector will more 
likely reduce interest rates and improve credit access. However, if informal lenders engage 
23 This was the case under the program analyzed in Esguerra (1987). 
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in some form of collusive behavior, then using informal lenders as conduits for formal sector 
funds is not likely to be beneficial for borrowers. The cost of funds for rural borrowers may 
not decline while rents from the program accrue to informal lenders [Floro and Ray (1992)]. 
In summary, informal finance performs a useful function in providing asset-poor 
households a way to gain access to credit. In particular, credit tying as a collateral substitute 
makes borrowing possible for rural households who would otherwise go without credit. 
However, because interlockers pursue lending only to support their main economic activities 
(e.g. trading or farming), the suggestion is that left to themselves, informal credit markets 
may be inadequate in completely substituting for formal institutions in rural areas. 
It is obvious that while there is a role for policy in improving the situation in rural 
financial markets, the question of what strategy will work in a particular country, region or 
locale at a given time is fundamentally an empirical issue. There is no single approach or 
answer to the problem of credit delivery for small rural borrowers. Attempts to solve 
problems of one type, such as improving small borrower access to formal credit by using 
informal lenders as conduits, present new problems. What is clear from experience, 
however, is that failure has been avoided in those cases where due attention has been given 
to the specificity of the situation and the informational and organizational requirements of 
credit delivery programs [Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega (1993)]. It is in the search for the 
appropriate institutional forms and technologies for credit delivery where the greatest 
challenge lies. Here research can play an important role in clarifying how informal lenders 
behave and how rural markets function. Proposals abound for promoting formal-informal 
sector linkages in rural financial markets. Pilot projects of one type or another to improve 
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rural credit delivery are being implemented in developing countries in various parts of the 
world. Policy makers would do well not to think of driving the informal lenders out of 
business before stable and permanent alternative institutions for credit delivery to small 
borrowers are in place. 
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